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BUSINESS INVITERS' DUTY TO PROTECT INVITEES
FROM CRIMINAL ACTS
MICHAEL J. YELNOSKYt
On the evening of November 11, 1977, Helen Butler was shop-
ping for groceries at the Acme Market in Montclair, New Jersey. After
completing her shopping, she left the supermarket and proceeded to her
automobile in the Acme's parking lot. She placed her packages on the
bumper of her car and opened the trunk. Suddenly, she was thrown
violently to the ground, and her pocketbook was stolen. Ms. Butler sub-
sequently instituted an action against Acme alleging that the injuries
she sustained in the attack were a result of the supermarket's negli-
gence in failing to provide her with a reasonably safe place to shop.'
Historically, courts have been unwilling to find that businesses
had a duty to protect customers like Ms. Butler from criminal acts oc-
curring on their premises. As the frequency of this type of criminal
activity increases, however, courts are facing the situation more often
and are becoming more responsive to the factors that militate against
continued application of a no-duty rule. Despite this trend, a number of
jurisdictions continue to refuse to recognize any duty to protect. Even
those courts that have abandoned the no-duty rule have not done so
entirely. They simply have conditioned the duty upon the existence of a
variety of circumstances, some quite vague, and others quite specific
and arbitrary.
This Comment surveys and analyzes recent developments in this
area of law and concludes that courts should adopt an unqualified
duty-to-protect rule2 that would require all business inviterss to take
t B.S. 1982, University of Vermont; J.D. Candidate, 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
I See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 279, 283-84, 426 A.2d 521,
523 (App. Div. 1981), affd, 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).
' The notion that under some circumstances there should be a duty to protect
invitees is not new. In Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landown-
ers' Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIz. L. REv.
727 (1979), the author argues for the adoption of such a rule. The duty proposed by
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reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the occurrence of
crime on their premises."
Bazyler would, however, be contingent upon the determination by the trial judge that
"a foreseeable risk of attack existed on the landowner's premises." Id. at 752. In con-
trast, the duty proposed here would be contingent upon a finding that the plaintiff was,
at the time of the attack, the defendant's invitee. See infra text accompanying note 132.
The duty proposed in this Comment differs from that proposed by Bazyler in another
important respect: it could not be discharged by the use of a warning to patrons regard-
ing the risks of crime on the premises. See Bazyler, supra, at 750 n.153. Bazyler wrote
his article at a time when few courts were willing to deviate from the common law rule
that there is no duty to protect another from the deliberate criminal acts of a third
party. As a result he was forced to look outside the business inviter/invitee context to
find judicial support for the duty he proposed. Since 1979, though, many courts have
recognized the force of arguments similar to those put forth by Bazyler and other com-
mentators, and the no-duty rule is disappearing. This Comment analyzes the effective-
ness and desirability of the recently developed alternatives to the no-duty rule and pro-
poses the adoption of a rule that avoids its problems.
I The terms business "inviter" and "invitee" are used throughout. For purposes of
this discussion, the business inviter is a person who occupies or possesses land that is
controlled for a business purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E
(1965). The business invitee is a person who is "invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of
the land." Id. § 332(3). The invitee can best be thought of as a business visitor or
customer. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 61, at 419 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER
& KEETON].
In certain situations, particularly when the possessor is not the owner of the prop-
erty, identification of the inviter may be difficult. For example, individual merchants
may rent space in a mall to conduct their business. Are they then responsible for the
areas outside the store that are used by their customers? Generally the answer to this
question can be found in the applicable landlord/tenant law. In Pennsylvania, for ex-
ample, when the owner of real estate leases premises to tenants but retains possession
and control of the common areas to be used by business invitees of the various tenants,
the obligation to keep the areas safe for such invitees, absent a contrary provision in the
leases, is imposed on the landlord. See Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546,
549-51 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
This Comment does not concern itself with the nuances involved in the common
law distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees and the differential duties
owed them by possessors of land. None of the cases discussed presents a situation where
the court had difficulty determining the status of the plaintiff. On the common law
distinctions, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329-332 (1965) (de-
fining trespasser, licensee, and invitee). These distinctions have been criticized and
some courts have flirted with the idea of abandoning them entirely. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 3, § 62, at 432-34.
" The duty to take reasonable steps extends to all those areas of the inviter's
premises that are within the scope of the invitation extended to invitees. The scope of
this duty includes all areas of the premises upon which the inviter gave the invitees
reason to believe that their presence was desired for the purpose for which they came.
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 comment 1 (1965). Entrances to the
property, exits, parking lots, the interior of buildings, and other areas provided for
invitees can be within this scope. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 61, at 424-
25 & nn.80-81. This Comment's focus on parking lots is a function of the frequency of
criminal activity taking place there. References to "open areas" are intended to encom-




Part I of the Comment outlines the extent of the problem of "pa-
tron victimization" and suggests that incidents like the one involving
Helen Butler are far too common to ignore. Part II discusses the rules
that courts are currently using to guide the resolution of suits brought
by injured invitees against the business inviter. Asserting that these ex-
isting rules are unresponsive, in varying degrees, to the crime and vic-
timization problems, Part III criticizes both the rationale and the re-
sults of such rules. In addition, this part discusses the policy arguments
on both sides and responds to concerns commonly expressed by those
who favor retention of the common law no-duty rule. The Comment
concludes that adoption of an unqualified duty-to-protect rule is
warranted.
I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BUSINESS INVITEE
VICTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The existence and threat of crime has become, for most Ameri-
cans, a fact of life. In the urban environment in particular, residents
and visitors must deal with crime on a daily basis.' Outlying suburbs,
small towns, and rural areas have also experienced tremendous in-
creases in crime rates since 1969.' Although there has been a decrease
in recent years in the per capita occurrence of crimes listed in the FBI's
crime index,7 the crime rate in the United States is still much higher
than in other Western industrial societies.8 In response to the encourag-
5 See W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME 28 (1981).
6 A review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Crime Index-which mea-
sures the reported occurrence of seven crimes (murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle
theft) per 100,000 inhabitants-indicates that no region or state has been unaffected by
the general and dramatic increase in crime. In 1984, no state had a lower total number
of crimes per 100,000 than it had in 1970. Compare FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 66-71 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as FBI CRIME REPORTS 1970] with FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 44-51 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FBI
CRIME REPORTS 1984]. In fact, many states without large urban areas, including Ar-
kansas, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Oregon, experienced increases in
criminal incidents per 100,000 inhabitants of 100% or more between 1970 and 1984.
Compare FBI CRIME REPORTS 1970, supra, at 72-79 with FBI CRIME REPORTS
1984, supra, at 52-59. Finally, between 1969 and 1982, cities with populations ranging
from 50,000 to 99,999 have experienced an increase in the "violence offense rate"
(measuring the occurrence of murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, rob-
bery, and aggravated assault per 100,000 inhabitants) of 141.9%, while cities with
populations of less than 10,000 have experienced an increase of 161.6%. See AMERICAN
VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 234 table 11 (L. Curtis ed. 1985).
7 See FBI CRIME REPORTS 1984, supra note 6, at 41.
s See Weiner & Wolfgang, The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in
America: 1969-1982, in AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 6, at
32-35 (discussing crime patterns throughout the 1970's showing that the United States
1986]
886 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing news of recent decreases in crime rates, commentators have noted
that, given the high rates of criminal violence remaining, the rates
"need not be on the upswing for the nation to be legitimately concerned
about their level."' Victimization surveys and public opinion polls show
that citizens are aware, and in many instances quite fearful, of the
crime problem. Surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization and the
National Opinion Research Center show that approximately forty-five
percent of the citizens polled could think of a place in their neighbor-
hood "where [they] would be afraid to walk alone at night."10 Individu-
als commonly respond to this fear by staying at home. 1
This common response is not without reason. Both victimization
surveys and police reports show that the majority of crimes take place
outside the home. For example, approximately sixty percent of all rob-
beries and forty percent of forcible rapes occur in public places."2 This
reality is reflected in survey results showing that downtown and under-
ground parking areas are among the areas citizens consider most
dangerous."3
As might be expected, areas where commercial activity takes place
have been hit especially hard by the crime problem. Commercial crime
is more prevalent than household and personal victimization, and the
crime rate for retail stores and proprietary parking structures is higher
than for other businesses.14 The parking lot seems to present unique
opportunities for crime. Customers are typically in possession of money
and recently purchased items. In this respect, the would-be assailant in
search of valuables need not take a chance on the unknown assets of
some passerby. 5 Furthermore, remote and poorly lit areas of parking
suffered homicide and robbery rates nearly three times those sustained by other West-
ern nations); see also W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 13 (summarizing
victim surveys and crime reports that reveal the high rate of crime in the United States
in comparison with other Western countries).
9 Weiner & Wolfgang, supra note 8, at 34.
10 W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 13 (citing NATIONAL OPINION
RESEARCH CENTER, NATIONAL DATA FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: GENERAL SOCIAL
SURVEY CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 1972-1977 (1978); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUB-
LIC OPINION RESEARCH, GALLUP OPINION INDEX (published monthly)).
11 See W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 13; see also J. CONKLIN,
THE IMPACT OF CRIME 105, 107-13 (1975) (stating that "[pleople often react to their
fear of crime by avoiding contact with others" and by minimizing the chance of
victimization).
I" See Weiner & Wolfgang, supra note 8, at 30-31.
2S See W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, supra note 5, at 186.
" See Bazyler, supra note 2, at 727-28 (citing LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE NA-
TION'S FIVE LARGEST CITIES 32 (1975) (finding that commercial robberies were four
to five times more prevalent than personal or household robberies).
15 This problem would seem to be particularly acute in bank parking lots. In
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lots present little danger of discovery. Courts and security experts have
recognized the challenges that these areas pose for the safety of business
patrons.16 Security experts have commented that "[t]here are very few
open areas, in industrial complexes, or elsewhere, which can be consid-
ered secure, particularly during the hours of darkness."1
In the past, the typical retail merchant did business from a street-
side shop. The only access to that shop was from the main entrance
adjacent to the street or sidewalk. Patrons were required to park in the
street or in large public lots provided for them by the city. Indeed, this
is still the typical pattern in most, if not all, large cities. Recently, how-
ever, merchants have begun moving to shopping centers and enclosed
malls with sizable private parking lots.1 Some large establishments,
such as sports arenas and hospitals, also have large parking lots and
other open areas outside the building that present similar problems.
Although it is not always clear in any given instance who is ultimately
responsible for these areas,19 there is some agreement that those respon-
sible for their condition have not been responsive to the dangers these
Drake v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the
plaintiff's decedent was kidnapped from a bank parking lot and later murdered. See id.
at 1014. The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the bank knew that its customers
often carried cash while using the parking lot yet failed to provide adequate security to
protect them. See id. at 1015. The court held that this allegation was not enough to
make the crime "foreseeable" without proof that the bank had advance warning of the
attack or that similar incidents had occurred in the parking lot. See id. at 1015. A
similar claim seems likely to arise in connection with automatic teller machines availa-
ble to customers after banking hours. Is the user the invitee of the bank? If so, in
jurisdictions that reject a no-duty rule, the bank may be required to take reasonable
steps to protect the customer from the criminal acts of third parties.
1" See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 130, 695 P.2d
653, 660, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 364 (1985) ("'In its very operation of a parking struc-
ture, defendants may be said to have created "an especial temptation and opportunity
for criminal misconduct," . . . .' ") (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622,
628, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1983) (quoting W. PROSSEsR, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 174 (4th ed. 1971))); see also D. HUGHES & P. BowLER, THE SEcURITy
SURVEY 118 (1982) (Outside parking facilities are included among the areas that can-
not be considered secure "without active patrolling by a security force.").
17 D. HUGHES & P. BowI.mR, supra note 16, at 118.
1" See Cherry, Liability of Business Property Owners for Injury to Customers in
Parking Lots by Criminal Attacks from Third Parties, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 141, 141
(1984).
19 See, e.g., Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 549-51 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(Under Pennsylvania law, where a real estate owner leases space to tenants but retains
possession and control of common areas, the owner has the obligation to keep the com-
mon areas safe.); see also supra note 3 (discussing Morgan and the application of
landlord/tenant law to identification of the inviter); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
3, § 63, at 440 ("When different parts of a building . . . are leased to several tenants,
the approaches and common passageways normally do not pass to the tenant, but re-
main in possession of the landlord.").
1986]
888 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
areas pose." ° Too often planners, for example, have ignored the margin
of safety that can be gained by designing buildings with security con-
cerns in mind.21
Given the effectiveness of many security measures, including the
most simple and inexpensive, 2 business inviters should be encouraged
to take those steps that are reasonable under the circumstances. To the
extent that they will not do so voluntarily, the law can further society's
interests by offering that encouragement in the form of an actionable
duty to protect. The following section of this Comment discusses the
rules that courts have developed in response to the problem as it has
been presented to them.2" The rationale for these rules and the results
that they produce are analyzed in the final section.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE BUSINESS INVITEE
VICTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Considerable disagreement exists as to whether the inviters' gener-
ally recognized duty to exercise reasonable care for invitees' safety
24
includes the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from the
criminal acts of third parties.25 Courts have exhibited a general reluc-
tance to tamper with the traditional common law doctrine that there is
20 See D. HUGHES & P. BOWLER, supra note 16, at 3-4; Bazyler, supra note 2,
at 729-30 & n.14; see also 0. NEWMAN, ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN FOR CRIME PRE-
VENTION 11 (1973) (noting the "conspicuous absence of consideration given to security
by architects" of residential housing projects, and insisting that such considerations can
be given without restricting the architect's "compositional imagination" or ability to
provide for the "functional needs of residents").
21 See D. HUGHES & P. BOWLER, supra note 16, at 3-4.
22 See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
28 Legislatures in many states have responded to the problems suffered by victims
by passing legislation that provides funds for crime victims to cover medical expenses,
lost work time, and property loss and damage. See Crime Victims Compensation Trust
Fund: Hearings on H.R. 2470 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983) (statement of
Neil Hartigan, Attorney General, Illinois) (noting that over one-half of the states have
crime victim compensation programs) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; see also Com-
ment, Negligence Liability for the Criminal Acts of Another, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 459,
462 n.17 (1982) (citing sources that discuss state compensation programs). Citizens
have responded in many ways, including staying indoors after dark and forming "citi-
zen" or "town" watches to involve the community in crime prevention through self-
policing. See J. CONKLIN, supra note 11, at 107-13, 194-209.
24 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 61, at 425.
28 For purposes of analyzing the business inviters' obligation to their invitees, ar-
eas privately owned and provided by them for the use of their patrons are part of the
business premises. See Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638, 281
S.E.2d 36, 38 (1981); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 61, at 424. Of course, a
parking lot may be a business in and of itself, in which case the users of the lot are
clearly invitees of the lot's owner.
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no duty to protect another from the deliberate criminal attack of a third
person. The reasons for this reluctance include the notion that the
criminal act is an intervening cause of harm, the difficulty in foreseeing
criminal acts, the vagueness of the standard of care required to meet the
duty, the economic consequences, and the fear of conflicting with the
policy that the protection of citizens is the duty of government.26 These
concerns have resulted in a proliferation of rules that either deny the
existence of a duty altogether or limit its application to certain
situations.
A. No-Duty Rules
Some courts have held that a plaintiff who is the victim of a crimi-
nal attack while on the defendant's premises cannot recover because the
business inviter simply has no duty to protect its patrons from criminal
acts. These courts often express an alternative rationale for denying a
recovery: that the criminal act itself, and not a lack of security, is the
proximate cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff. Other courts
hold that as a matter of law there is insufficient evidence to establish
causation when the plaintiff can offer only circumstantial proof of the
cause of the injury. Since the results are the same in these cases, they
are all discussed under the no-duty rubric.
Courts taking these positions typically explain their holdings in
terms of "fairness" or a reluctance to make a business inviter the in-
surer of invitees' safety. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, for exam-
ple, used both explanations in Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc.
7
The court sustained the defendant supermarket owner's demurrer to
the plaintiff's allegations that the failure to provide adequate lighting
and personnel was the cause of a purse snatching that resulted in her
injury. Relying on an earlier case involving the employer/employee re-
lationship, in which the court had stated simply that it was "'unable to
see that an employer has a general duty to protect his employees from
the assaults of criminals,' "28 the Davis court held that the same rule
applied to the business inviter/invitee relationship.2" The fear of in-
surer liability has been instrumental in the refusal of other courts to
28 See Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. 1975)).
ai 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976).
28 Id. at 964 (quoting McMillin v. Barton-Robison Convoy Co., 182 Okla. 553,
555, 78 P.2d 789, 790 (1938)).
29 See Davis, 547 P.2d at 964. The court did refer to the plaintiff's arguments
that the crime problem demanded some reasonable response by business inviters. Al-
though the court recognized the problem, it saw no reason to depart from its previous
holding. See id. at 965.
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find that a duty to protect exists.30 The Davis court, which decided the
case on the absence of a duty to protect, noted, alternatively, that the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages was the independent, inter-
vening criminal act of a third party. 1
In Shaner v. Tucson Airport Authority, 2 the court refused to im-
pose a duty where there was no evidence of how a kidnapping on the
defendants' airport parking lot had occurred. Mr. Shaner, the dece-
dent's husband, alleged that inadequate lighting and security were re-
sponsible for the kidnapping and subsequent murder of his wife. De-
spite evidence that the security in and around the lot was insufficient, 3
the court directed a verdict for the defendants. The court reasoned that
Mr. Shaner did not establish a reasonable probability that this insuffi-
ciency was a substantial factor in bringing about the decedent's abduc-
tion. Without evidence of what actually went on in the parking lot, the
jury would be "left to sheer speculation" on the cause of Mrs. Shaner's
death." Although it is unclear what evidence would have allowed the
case to go to the jury, the court seemed to want evidence that a specific
lapse in security was responsible for the crime.3 5 The court avoided a
30 See, e.g., Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., 117 Ariz. 444, 448, 573 P.2d 518,
522 (Ct. App. 1977) ("To hold otherwise in this case would make [defendants] insurers
of the safety of [the victim] which would be an impermissible imposition of liability.");
Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507, 509 (D.C. 1976) ("[Ilt does not follow that
the common law of negligence imposes an obligation upon private enterprises to provide
armed guards to insure the safety of persons invited to do business with them.").
8" See Davis, 547 P.2d at 965.
82 117 Ariz. 444, 573 P.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1977).
" See id. at 446, 573 P.2d at 520. The record showed that the parking lot was so
poorly lit that it was necessary to shine a flashlight to see inside a car. No security
personnel were assigned specifically to the lot. Security personiel checked the lot only if
they were needed to help start a patron's car, if they were driving by on an adjacent
road, or if they happened to look out on the lot from the airport terminal's second floor.
See id.
4 Id. at 448, 573 P.2d at 522.
11 Shaner indicated that when there are no witnesses to the incident and the
plaintiff cannot testify liability will not be imposed. See id. A similar result was
reached in Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). The Supreme
Court of Utah held that the defendant hotel operator was entitled to summary judg-
ment in a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff claimed that inadequate security
was responsible for the murder of the decedent in his hotel room:
[T]here is no direct evidence linking Mitchell's death with the alleged in-
adequate security measures at the Hilton . . . . Mitchell himself obvi-
ously was unable to testify, and there were apparently no eyewitnesses
other than the unknown murderer. The fact that there was no evidence of
forced entry into Mitchell's room could be probative of entrance by a per-
son using an unauthorized master or room key. However, it could also be
probative of entrance, at Mitchell's invitation, by a friend or colleague.
Any supposition, therefore, as to the manner of entrance to Mitchell's
room or the identity of the assailant would be totally speculative. A jury
cannot be permitted to engage in such speculation.
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discussion of the no-duty rule, but its finding that causation could not
be established under the circumstances is functionally equivalent to a
finding that the airport owed no duty to the decedent."6
B. Duty Contingent upon the Existence of Special Facts or
Circumstances That Establish Foreseeability
The majority of courts that have considered inviters' liability are
unwilling to say that a business inviter never has a duty to take reason-
able steps to protect invitees from criminal acts. However, such courts
universally hold that the duty arises only in specific situations.
The first group of cases to be considered narrowly limits the exis-
tence of the duty. Unless the inviter's premises attract or provide a
unique climate for crime, or the defendant inviter knew or had reason
to know that criminal acts posing imminent probability of harm to an
invitee were occurring or were immediately about to occur, no duty to
protect arises.3 7 Though courts in other jurisdictions with less restric-
tive limited-duty rules typically use the same "knew or had reason to
know" language,"8 the jurisdictions discussed in the following
paragraphs interpret that standard much more narrowly.
Although courts frequently state that a duty to protect arises if a
business provides a "unique climate for crime," few cases turn on or
even discuss this issue. Therefore, analyzing the content of the showing
that the plaintiff must make is impossible."9 Of more importance to an
understanding of the law is the meaning given to the phrase "knew or
had reason to know," since courts that espouse a limited-duty rule con-
Id. at 246.
36 See infra text accompanying note 83 (suggesting the need for permitting plain-
tiffs to rely on some circumstantial evidence).
37 See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975) (finding that
a shopping center owner was not liable for injuries sustained by a shopper who was the
victim of a sudden assault by an unidentified third party).
" See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing the "prior similar
acts" standard).
" Comment f of section 344 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS (1965),
however, does have a "character of business" provision. See infra notes 66-72 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Restatement approach and the courts that have ac-
cepted it). A case arguably relying heavily on the "character" of the defendant's busi-
ness is Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 122 Ill. App. 3d 405, 461 N.E.2d 616 (1984).
In Rosemont, the plaintiff was attacked in the parking lot of a public arena in which
AC/DC, a "heavy metal" band, had been performing. Relying on evidence that the
village, the arena's owner, had sufficient advance warning that previous AC/DC con-
certs attracted rowdy drinkers and drug users, the court found that the village owed a
duty "to its business invitees to take reasonable steps and exercise the degree of care
and vigilance practicable under the circumstances to prevent injury." Id. at 409, 461
N.E.2d at 619.
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dition the existence of a duty to protect on "foreseeability. "40
In Cornpropst v. Sloan,"' the court held that the plaintiff, who
was assaulted in the parking lot of the defendant's shopping center, did
not state a cause of action against the shopping center when she alleged
that, by virtue of other crimes on or in the vicinity of the premises, the
defendant knew, or should have known, that she would be exposed to
acts of violence and faced a potential danger.42 The court held that as a
matter of law there would be no liability imposed on the owners of the
shopping center for the sudden criminal act of a "temporarily or per-
manently depraved person" who gave no notice indicating an intention
to commit an assault.43
The opinion in Cornpropst and decisions in jurisdictions with sim-
ilar rules indicate that unless the specific crime is imminent and the
defendant is aware of its imminence there will be no duty to protect
invitees. These courts refrain from imposing a duty on business inviters
when the plaintiff claims that prior criminal acts put the defendant on
notice or when the act that harmed the plaintiff is deemed "spontane-
ous." In either case the court will say that the defendant was not on
notice: in the former because the prior occurrence of criminal acts does
not imply that a new crime is imminent, and in the latter because the
criminal act happened too quickly for the defendant to be expected to
respond.
In Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 44 the Supreme Court of Alabama
applied this foreseeability formula to deny the plaintiff recovery against
the owners and operators of a parking garage for injuries sustained
when she was forced into her car and, after being instructed to leave
the garage, raped. She produced evidence that, in the ten years prior to
her abduction, one battery, six break-ins, two robberies, and seven
thefts had occurred in the garage.41 In affirming the summary judg-
ment for the defendants, the court said that these prior occurrences did
not make the attack on the plaintiff foreseeable. The court stated that
the evidence of prior criminal activity "failed to establish that the de-
fendant knew or had reason to know that '"acts [were] occurring or
40 As Prosser and Keeton have noted, duty is frequently dealt with in terms of
proximate cause. PRossER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 54, at 358. The decisions
under discussion generally present the issue in terms of duty, though on occasion the
phrases are used interchangeably, and the court discusses proximate cause as an alter-
native rationale for denying recovery.See Davis, 547 P.2d at 965.
41 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
112 See id. at 198.
4' See id. at 197.
" 456 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1984).
45 See id. at 273.
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about to occur on the premises that pose[d] imminent probability of
harm to an invitee." ' "46
The foreseeability requirement has also been read to require alle-
gation and proof of specific facts that would put the defendant on notice
that a particular person was likely to assault an invitee or that a partic-
ular invitee was likely to be assaulted.47 Only then would it be estab-
lished that the defendant had specific knowledge, notice, or warning of
a danger. Evidence of prior incidents would not, therefore, be relevant
to the plaintiff's case.48 Following this standard, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, in Kelly v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc.,4 9 held that the fatal
shooting of the decedent in the defendant's parking lot was not "reason-
ably foreseeable." The court reached this decision despite evidence
showing that sixteen thefts or burglaries, three incidents of vandalism,
two assaults, one attempted auto theft, one attempted fraud, two armed
robberies, and one simple assault occurred on the premises in the three
years preceding the fatal shooting."
46 Id. at 277 (quoting Latham v. Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209, 213 (Ala.
1983) (quoting Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 198)). The court also discussed the foresee-
ability issue in terms of proximate cause:
"'Assuming arguendo, that the complaint in this case states a cause of
action . . .we would dismiss the lawsuit for another reason. The facts
alleged . . .establish an efficient, intervening and unforeseeable cause for
the injury sustained by ...[the plaintiff]. The minds of reasonable men
cannot differ but that the sudden act [of the third party] which could not
have been prevented or deterred by the exercise of reasonable care on the
part of the shopping center merchants, was the sole proximate legal cause
of [the] harm.'"
Id. (quoting Latham v. Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209, 213 (Ala. 1983) (quoting
Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 198)).
47 See Reichenbach v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366, 1369 & n.13
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Cowart, J., concurring) (citing Florida cases that require
specific foreseeability), petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1982). This
case involved the innkeeper/guest relationship, but the similarity of the fact pattern and
standard applied are instructive.
48 See id. at 1368 n.4 (concluding that "the innkeeper had no prior warning or
notice that [the plaintiff] might be harmed or that the assailant might harm any
guest").
49 417 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1982).
5o See id. at 559-60. The court had alternative grounds for affirming the lower
court's decision for the owners. Specifically, the court held that the security measures,
which included regular 30-minute patrols of the area by an assistant manager, were
reasonable as a matter of law. The court added that the decedent's voluntary interfer-
ence into a hostile situation was an independent intervening cause that could not have
been foreseen or prevented by the defendant. See id. at 560-61.
The courts have given little treatment to defenses in this context because the battle
has been over the existence or nonexistence of a duty. It is unclear, therefore, what role
implied assumption of risk as a separate defense will play. Two schools of thought have
developed on this issue. One argues that the plaintiff's reasonable assumption of risk (if
unreasonable the defense would be universally recognized as contributory negligence)
would not be a bar to recovery unless, as a result of the plaintiff's knowledge, it could
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In Kelly, the court stressed that the shooting was sudden and
spontaneous and that the defendant had notice of it only seconds prior
to its occurrence. These facts were vital to the court's alternative hold-
ing that the defendant could not have been negligent as a matter of
law.51 Lack of notice to the defendant store owner as a result of the
spontaneous nature of the incident was also the basis for the decision in
favor of the store owner in Munn v. Hardee's Food Systems. 52 Sparked
by derogatory racial comments made outside the building and out of the
presence of the defendant's employees, the events leading up to the fatal
shooting of the plaintiff's decedent were characterized as "spontane-
ous." 53 The record was deemed "insufficient to show that the [defend-
ant] knew or had reason to know that such acts were occurring or
about to occur.""
This standard vests in the trial judge a significant amount of
power to deny the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The circum-
stances leading up to the event must have given the defendant actual
notice that the plaintiff was in danger of an attack by a known third
party or parties. If the notice was too close in time to the actual event,
the court may find that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty be-
cause the notice received did not provide the defendant an adequate
be said that the defendant owed no duty. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 55, 155 A.2d 90, 96 (1959). The other school is best represented by
section 496C of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs (1965), which provides that a
defendant who has breached a duty of care may defend on the ground that the plaintiff
fully understood the risk caused by the defendant's conduct but voluntarily chose to be
exposed to it. The defense would be available even if the plaintiff's actions were
reasonable.
If, as suggested by Michael Bazyler, the inviter's duty could be satisfied by simply
warning the invitee of the possible dangers of crime on the premises, see Bazyler, supra
note 2, at 750 n.153, the issue would be moot. There would be no duty owed to a
person who assumed the risk, because that person already possessed knowledge of the
danger. Alternatively, if it were held that the duty was breached, section 4960 would
be available as a defense. See James, Assumption of Risk Unhappy Reincarnation, 78
YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
However, the two views will produce different results where, as suggested here,
the defendant's duty goes beyond warning and includes taking additional precautions
for the plaintiff's safety. A rejection of implied assumption of risk as a defense to the
breach of this duty would be an assertion that the dangers of a failure to provide ade-
quate security are unreasonable even to those who are aware of such dangers. This
would seem to be the appropriate response in the inviter/invitee situation. See infra
notes 114-22 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons that favor an unquali-
fied duty to protect). The recognition of implied assumption of risk as a defense is
inconsistent with the policies that support the imposition of a duty to protect that ex-
tends beyond warning. See James, supra, at 193-94.
51 See Kelly, 417 So. 2d at 561.
52 274 S.C. 529, 266 S.E.2d 414 (1980) (per curiam).





Another group of courts has interpreted the foreseeability require-
ment more broadly, holding that prior acts can be sufficient to give rise
to a duty on the part of the business inviter to protect invitees from
criminal acts. The question of proximate cause is left to the jury.5"
This less restrictive interpretation of proximate cause is, of course, con-
tingent upon the requisite showing of foreseeability. This burden can
be satisfied by evidence of prior similar acts on the defendant's
premises.
Although the "prior similar incidents" rule5" does expand the con-
cept of foreseeability as defined by the Cornpropst, Henley, and Kelly
courts, it too imposes strict guidelines on the evidence that the plaintiff
must present to give rise to a duty to protect. In McCoy v. Gay,57 for
example, the plaintiff customer was attacked in the parking lot of the
defendant's cocktail lounge and sought to demonstrate the defendant's
knowledge of a dangerous condition with evidence of two prior crimes
that occurred on the premises but not in the parking lot. While the
court agreed that evidence of a prior similar incident tending to show a
dangerous condition and knowledge of that condition is admissible, the
opinion stressed that the conditions of the incidents compared must be
substantially similar." In affirming a directed verdict for the owners of
the cocktail lounge, the court held that because the prior acts had not
occurred in the parking lot the customer's evidence had no relevance or
probative value to the issue of the owner's knowledge of a dangerous
condition there. 9
I" See, e.g., Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 279, 426 A.2d 521
(App. Div. 1981), affd, 89 N.J. 270,445 A.2d 1141 (1982). In Butler, the plaintiff's
evidence of prior crimes and of the defendant's employment of security guards indicated
an awareness of the problem and satisfied the court "that an inference could be drawn
by the jury that reasonable security measures would have served as a deterrent to crimi-
nal attacks upon customers in defendant's parking lot, and that defendant's failure to
take such measures . . . was a substantial contributory factor in the assault on plain-
tiff." Id. at 289, 426 A.2d at 526; see also McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 591, 302
S.E.2d 130, 131 (1983) ("'Ordinarily . . . [the defendant] would be insulated from
liability by the intervention of an illegal act . . . . However, the . . . rule has been
held inapplicable if the defendant . . . had reasonable grounds for apprehending that
such criminal act would be committed.' ") (quoting McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 756, 272 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1980)).
56 See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 123-30, 695
P.2d 653, 658-61, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 360-64 (1985) (discussing recent California
cases that followed the "prior similar incidents" approach).
57 165 Ga. App. 590, 302 S.E.2d 130 (1983).
5 See id. at 592, 302 S.E.2d at 131.
, See id. at 593-94, 302 S.E.2d at 132-33. The court treated in similar fashion
the plaintiff's evidence of a shooting in the parking lot 10 years before the incident. The
evidence was dismissed as irrelevant because there was not a sufficient foundation for
showing that the conditions complained of by the plaintiff-inadequate lighting and the
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Courts applying this rule have a significant amount of discretion
to decide how "prior" or "similar" incidents must be in order to be
relevant to the foreseeability issue. A number of examples are instruc-
tive. Police response to ten prior alarms at the defendant's bank was
held to be insufficient to show that the defendant was aware that a
customer might be robbed at gunpoint in the parking lot, because none
of the prior alarms was related to a parking lot robbery.60 Evidence
that the business premises were in a high crime area did not give rise to
a duty to protect, absent allegations of specific prior crimes on the
premises.6i A complaint alleging that the defendant restaurant owner
should have been required to provide adequate security to its patrons
was insufficient when it alleged that the restaurant was frequented in
the early morning hours by intoxicated persons who typically acted in a
dangerous manner. To give rise to the duty, the plaintiff would have
had to allege that specific crimes occurred on the premises, that specific
individuals committed violent acts on the premises, or that the individ-
ual attacker had previously been on the premises and had acted
violently. 2
In one of the more restrictive interpretations of the rule, an Illinois
court held that the plaintiff, who was stabbed while in a mall parking
lot, could not withstand summary judgment despite proof of prior acts
that included numerous shoplifting incidents, four automobile thefts,
and twenty thefts from automobiles..6 The court stated that knowledge
of crimes against property is not sufficient to give rise to a duty to
protect customers against physical assaults: "To hold otherwise would
place liability on shopping centers regardless of the foreseeability."6 4
absence of full-time security personnel-existed at the time of the shooting 10 years
earlier. In the court's words, "[T]here was an insufficient showing of similarity be-
tween the physical conditions surrounding the prior shooting in the parking lot and the
assault on [the] appellant . . . 2" Id. at 593, 302 S.E.2d at 132.
'0 See McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 756, 272
S.E.2d 592, 593 (1980).
01 See, e.g., Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The Meadows court declared that the duty is a product not of
foreseeability but of fairness. See id. at 721. However, an exception to the court's no-
duty rule was the existence of special facts tending to indicate that the failure to protect
could expose an invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm. The court stated that a gen-
eral allegation that the premises were in a high crime area did not constitute "special
facts." Id.
02 See Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). The plain-
tiff in Nappier was given leave to amend the complaint. See id. Although the court
seemed to approve section 344 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), that
section, as will be discussed below, is incompatible with a "prior similar acts" ap-
proach. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
6S See Taylor v. Hocker, 101 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641, 428 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1981).
64 Id. at 642, 428 N.E.2d at 665.
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The prior similar incidents rule does not constitute a complete bar to
recovery, however, and there are cases in which the plaintiff has been
able to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
65
Finally, a number of jurisdictions have accepted an interpretation
of foreseeability that takes into account factors other than the occur-
rence of prior similar acts on the business inviter's premises. In these
jurisdictions fewer cases are kept from the jury, which is then required
to decide whether the measures taken by the defendant to protect busi-
ness invitees were reasonable under the circumstances.
One impetus for the change has been section 344 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. The Restatement sets forth the rule as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry
for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of
the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose,
for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or in-
tentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by
the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely
to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to
avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.66
Comment f to this section makes it clear that the duty is contingent
upon some notice:
[The possessor] may, however, know or have reason to know,
from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on
the part of third persons in general which is likely to endan-
ger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to
expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place
or character of his business, or his past experience, is such
that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal con-
duct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some
6 See, e.g., Brown v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (The plaintiff, who was shot while on supermarket premises, stated a
proper cause of action in a complaint alleging that in the two years prior to the incident
there were 16 robberies with a firearm, 7 other robberies, and 136 other reported
crimes on the store's premises); Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super.
149, 369 A.2d 38 (Law Div. 1976) (The defendant's motion for summary judgment
was denied when evidence showed that at least five previous assaults had occurred on
the defendant's premises immediately prior to the plaintiff's assault and rape.); Daily v.
K-Mart Corp., 9 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 458 N.E.2d 471 (1981) (The enumeration of prior
criminal incidents taking place on the defendant's premises allowed the plaintiff to
avoid summary judgment.).
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 344 (1965).
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particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions
against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of
servants to afford a reasonable protection.
In comparison with the other limited-duty approaches discussed thus
far, comment f-in particular, the phrase "know or have reason to
know"-significantly increases the circumstances that may constitute
adequate notice.
67
Acceptance of the Restatement approach makes it easier for plain-
tiffs to prove facts that give rise to a duty to protect and to get to the
jury on the question of breach of that duty. Results like the one in
Taylor v. Hocker,6 8 in which the court held that property crimes do not
give rise to a duty to protect patrons against assaults, would not occur
in jurisdictions accepting the'Restatement approach. 9 For example, in
Morgan v. Bucks Associates," the plaintiff was assaulted as she
walked to her car in the parking lot of a mall. In the year prior to the
assault, there had been seventy-seven car thefts and fifteen attempted
car thefts from this parking lot. Quoting the Restatement, the court
rejected the defendants' argument that it had a duty to protect against
cars being stolen but not attacks on patrons:
The numerous criminal activities that occurred on the park-
ing lot, i.e., the car thefts, were sufficient for the jury to de-
termine that the defendant knew or had reason to know,
"that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third
persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of
the visitor," and that defendant's past experience was "such
that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal con-
duct on the part of third persons.' '71
07 The phrase "know or has reason to know" is the touchstone of the duty. How-
ever, compare its content in this context to the cases applying a more restrictive ap-
proach. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
101 Ill. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d 662 (1981).
09 See id. at 642, 428 N.E.2d at 665; see also supra notes 63-64 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Taylor).
'0 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
1 Id. at 551 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 comment f
(1965)). The Restatement rule was also adopted in Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint
Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). The plaintiff, who was assaulted,
presented evidence of 31 criminal incidents on the shopping mall owner's premises in
the year before her assault. Five of those incidents had been assaults similar to hers.
Although not forced by the facts to do so, the court adopted the more expansive inter-
pretation of the foreseeability requirement: "It is axiomatic that to establish the element
of foreseeability, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant foresaw the injury in
the exact form in which it occurred." Id. at 642, 281 S.E.2d at 40. The case attracted
much commentary at the time. See Note, Merchant's Duty to Protect its Customers
from Third-Party Criminal Acts-Foster v. Winston Salem Joint Venture, 18 WAKE
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Decisions like Morgan indicate that general criminal activity oc-
curring on a business's premises can be enough to give rise to the duty
to protect in a Restatement jurisdiction. One court has indicated that
under the Restatement approach criminal activity in close proximity to
a hotel's premises should make the business inviter aware of facts
prompting an investigation into the extent of crime in the area and a
determination of what security measures are necessary to protect pa-
trons within the perimeter of the hotel's premises."
The California Supreme Court has gone one step further. In
Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,7" the court rejected the prior
similar incidents rule and pushed the language'and rationale of section
344 to its limits when it held that the duty that a business inviter owes
to an invitee should be determined by the "totality of the circum-
stances."7 4 The plaintiff in Isaacs was shot while in the parking lot of
a hospital that was located in a "high crime area." Several thousand
assaults and numerous thefts and incidents of harassment had occurred
in an area near the parking lot. These facts, together with the knowl-
edge that emergency room facilities are particularly dangerous and that
parking lots provide opportunities for criminal misconduct that do not
exist elsewhere, were enough to establish a duty to protect against
criminal acts.75 The court also stressed the minimal burden that such a
duty imposes on the defendant and the value to society of imposing it.
7
1
Though the California rule will make it easier for plaintiffs injured in
high crime areas to take their cases to the jury, the Isaacs court stopped
short of imposing an absolute duty on business inviters to take reasona-
FOREST L. REV. 114 (1982) (generally criticizing the decision to go further than neces-
sary and accept the Restatement, and expressing concern that the merchants of North
Carolina were left without a concise standard on which to base their future actions)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Merchant's Duty to Protect]; Note, Foster v. Winston-Salem
Joint Venture: Duty of Mall Owners to Take Measures to Protect Invitees from Crimi-
nal Acts, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1126 (1982) (discussing the court's opinion and concluding
that in some situations recognizing the duty to protect would impose costs on society as
a whole that would outweigh its benefits) [hereinafter cited as Note, Duty of Mall
Owners]. The Restatement approach and the rationale of Foster were applied to the
innkeeper/guest relationship in Urbano v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 58 N.C. App.
795, 295 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
72 See Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); see also Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 Or. 695, 688 P.2d 811 (1984)
(Whether a reasonably prudent person in the position of the defendant parking lot
owner would have employed security people to protect invitees "if he knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that there were a large number of
reports ...of crimes in the immediate area" was an issue for the jury.).
73 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
7' See id. at 131, 695 P.2d at 661, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
75 See id. at 131, 695 P.2d at 661-62, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
76 See id. at 132, 695 P.2d at 662, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
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ble precautions to protect their invitees from the criminal acts of third
parties.
Despite cases like Morgan and Isaacs, which recognize a variety
of factors suggesting that the common law no-duty rule should be dis-
carded, there is universal ambivalence about abandoning the rule en-
tirely. This ambivalence has led to a confusing and unsatisfactory array
of exceptions to the common law rule. The time has come to do away
with the rule and its modifications entirely and to impose an unquali-
fied duty on business inviters to take reasonable steps to protect their
invitees from criminal acts. The existing rules are in some instances
wholly contrary to tort law doctrine and in others nothing but arbitrary
barriers to recovery. In addition to these problems with the existing
rules, there are compelling policy reasons for imposing a duty to pro-
tect. Moreover, despite fears that have been expressed to the contrary,
business inviters should have little trouble identifying the steps required
to meet the duty; they will not be made the insurers of their invitees'
safety, and their use of private security personnel will not mean the end
of law and order.
III. REASONS FOR REJECTING THE EXISTING RULES AND
ACCEPTING AN UNQUALIFIED DUTY TO PROTECT
A. The Undesirability of the Existing Rules
The rules set forth above are subject to criticism for a variety of
reasons. When analyzed, a number of the rules reveal a failure to con-
form to widely recognized tort law doctrine. Others reveal a tendency to
produce arbitrary and unpredictable results as a result of the power
they vest in the trial judge to determine the issue of "foreseeability."
All of the existing rules fail, to some degree, to recognize the prevalence
of the invitee victimization problem, the deterrent effect of adequate
and properly implemented security systems, and the propriety of im-
77 The court stated that criminal acts must be foreseeable to the inviter before a
duty will be imposed and that other factors must also be weighed in determining
whether there is a duty. See id. at 131 n.7, 695 P.2d at 662 n.7, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365
n.7. In addition to foreseeability, these factors include:
"the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of prevent-
ing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with result-
ing liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved."
Id. at 125-26, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (quoting Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)).
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posing liability on the business inviter in these situations.
1. The No-Duty Rules
As discussed above, some courts hold that the plaintiff cannot pro-
duce evidence sufficient to meet the burden of proof required on the
issue of the causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
harm the plaintiff has suffered.7  These courts include those that hold
that presenting only circumstantial evidence of how the crime occurred
is fatal to a finding of cause in fact, 7  as well as those that find, as a
matter of law, that the criminal acts are a superseding cause of the
plaintiff's harm. 0 These latter rules apply traditional proximate cause
analysis. It is important, however, to remember that proximate cause
and duty are related concepts: both are legal conclusions about the lim-
its of a defendant's liability based in large part on considerations of
policy." To the extent that these concepts are similar, the policy rea-
sons for imposing the duty discussed below also support the argument
that a defendant's lack of security can be the proximate cause of a crim-
inal attack on an invitee.
Cause in fact, however, is strictly a problem of proof. The plaintiff
must produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that it is more likely than not that the defendant's conduct was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the result."2 Absent the availability of
direct testimony from the victim or a witness concerning the facts of the
incident, the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence to establish
causation. Failure to admit evidence of this nature arbitrarily denies a
recovery to any plaintiff who is the victim of an unwitnessed attack and
71 See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
7' See Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., 117 Ariz. 444, 448, 573 P.2d 518, 522
(Ct. App. 1977); see also supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing
Shaner).
0 See Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963, 965 (Okla. 1976); see
also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing Davis).
81 See, e.g., PaossER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 42, at 274 ("It is quite possi-
ble, [and often helpful,] to state every question which arises in connection with 'proxi-
mate cause' in the form of a single question: was the defendant under a duty to protect
the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur?"). Indeed, in Davis v. Allied
Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976), the court decided the case on the duty
issue but admitted that even if it could be said that a duty to protect did exist, it would
reach the conclusion that the plaintiff's case should be dismissed on the basis of proxi-
mate-cause analysis. See id. at 965; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) ("[Llegal duties
are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of
a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.").
sI See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 41, at 269.
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who is, for some reason, unable to testify.
83
A court should recognize, or at least admit evidence tending to
show, that security measures, if properly implemented, can reduce
criminal activity by eliminating criminal opportunity.
4 For example,
one study indicated that increased street lighting in a community re-
duced incidents of crime by forty percent.
8 5 The actual design of a
physical environment can deter crime as well. This design objective can
be applied to a single building or an entire urban area, where safety
and security can be built into streets, buildings, and parks.
8 6 Designs
that allow the inhabitants of an environment to keep watch on potential
crime targets as they go about their normal patterns of activity, that
place barriers in the paths of would-be assailants, and that force traffic
into an area that is easily controlled, are capable of reducing the occur-
rence of crime and vandalism by as much as fifty percent.
8 7 Security
experts have also recognized the effectiveness of formal surveillance by
police and citizens' blockwatches.
88 In an effort to put some of this
knowledge to work, cities have been encouraged to adopt security codes
for buildings and other environs or to alter existing building codes to
include security standards.8 9
Proof of the effectiveness of security measures together with the
" See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty facing
the plaintiff in Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., 117 Ariz. 444, 573 P.2d 518 (Ct. App.
1977), in bringing an action to recover damages resulting from his wife's murder). This
situation invariably arises when the invitee is killed as a result of the attack. On cir-
cumstantial proof of causation, see J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PRO-
cEsS 132-34 (2d ed. 1981).
"4 See A. BILEK, J. KLOTTER & R. FEDERAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATE SE-
CURITY 206 (1981); C. JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL
DESIGN 224 (1971); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 62 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N]; 0. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 3-4.
85 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 84, at 64. On the relationship
of pedestrian street traffic to frequency of street crime, see J. CONKLIN, supra note 11,
at 10.
88 See C. JEFFERY, supra note 84, at 224.
VT See 0. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 3-11.
88 See B. POYNER, DESIGN AGAINST CRIME: BEYOND DEFENSIBLE SPACE 7
(1983). Although critical of some of Oscar Newman's theories, see 0. NEWMAN, supra
note 20, and the research methods employed in many studies of the efficacy of security
measures, Barry Poyner recognizes that benefits can be realized by limiting access to
areas, designing "natural surveillance" into an environment, and using formal surveil-
lance techniques, particularly in areas with specific concentrations of crime. See B.
POYNER, supra, at 7-14. In Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 Or. 695, 706-09, 688 P.2d
811, 817-19 (1984), the court recounted the testimony of a number of witnesses who
stated that the rate of criminal activity in and around the mall decreased as the number
of security personnel assigned to the area was increased.
89 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 84, at 64. But see Bazyler,
supra note 2, at 753 n.159 (It is impossible to determine the specific steps that should
be taken in all situations.).
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knowledge of the prevalence of crime in our society should be enough to
allow the plaintiff to meet the burden of production on the issue of
cause in fact. This circumstantial evidence establishes that as a matter
of ordinary experience failure to take steps to prevent crime from oc-
curring on business premises may be expected to result in an attack on
an invitee. With this burden met, the factfinder may conclude that
there is a causal relationship between the inadequate security and the
attack.90
Under such a standard, intervening causes of harm would not dis-
charge a defendant's liability for breach of a duty. If the intervening act
could reasonably be anticipated, the defendant may be negligent for
failure to guard against it.91 Decisions finding that criminal acts are
always superseding causes of harm ignore any notice the defendant may
have received and sanction failures to respond reasonably to a known
risk. The "reasonable person" in our society should not be entitled,
given the prevalence of crime, to assume that third parties will not com-
mit criminal acts that might result in harm to invitees. As courts have
suggested, "'foreseeability is not to be measured by what is more prob-
able than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of
it in guiding practical conduct.' "92
A reasonable person should have the security of invitees in mind
and should exercise care to guard against the risks posed by criminal
activity. Upon proof of failure to exercise this degree of care, the de-
fendant could be held responsible for the harm suffered by an invitee.
Section 449 of the Restatement recognizes the propriety of such an ap-
proach: "If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which make the actor negli-
gent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or
criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby." 3
If courts actually applied the standard that a duty to protect arises
when a defendant's premises provide a unique climate for crime,9 evi-
90 See PRossFR & KEntON, supra note 3, § 41, at 270.
91 See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 279, 288, 426 A.2d 521, 525
(App. Div. 1981), affd, 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982); PRossER & KEETON,
supra note 3, § 44, at 303. Moreover, the question of whether a negligent act is a
proximate cause of an injury generally presents an issue for determination by the jury.
See Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
92 Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1983)
(quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 57, 665 P.2d 947, 952, 192
Cal. Rptr. 857, 862 (1983)).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
" See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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dence suggesting that business premises attract crime should result in
an imposition of the duty. All commercial establishments attract crime
to some extent, and all business inviters should, therefore, protect their
patrons from the inevitable results. Malls,95 parking lots and other
open areas,96 and all night convenience stores97 have been cited as par-
ticularly "attractive." With respect to these high risk areas, one court
has observed that "'the peculiar attraction ...for the criminal may
necessitate some minimal human or mechanical means of protecting pa-
trons.' "98l Yet the courts following a no-duty standard fail to recognize
the relationship between injuries to invitees and the attractiveness of the
inviter's location to the criminal.
2. Duty Contingent upon the Existence of Special Facts or
Circumstances That Establish Foreseeability
Following a strict interpretation of the "knew or had reason to
know" standard, other courts require that the plaintiff prove special
facts in order to establish a duty to protect. Courts that strictly construe
this standard refuse to hold defendants responsible for harm suffered as
a result of "spontaneous" criminal activity. 9 Such a rule is undesirable
for a number of reasons. First, it is clear that almost every criminal act
occurs without actual warning. This standard could, therefore, be ap-
plied to deny recovery in almost every situation. Furthermore, this
standard actually encourages business property owners to refrain from
actively investigating potentially dangerous situations because as long as
they are not aware of them they are not obligated to provide any pro-
tection. Ignorance can be bliss.
The rationale for the special facts rule is that it would be unfair to
subject defendants to liability for failure to react to situations of which
they are not aware. However, the same lackadaisical attitude toward
security that is responsible for the attack may also be responsible for
defendants' failure to receive actual notice of the probability of attack.
This rule also refuses to admit evidence of prior acts on the issue of
See Note, Merchant's Duty to Protect, supra note 71, at 123.
9 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
t See Cohen v. Southland Corp., 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 140-41, 203 Cal. Rptr.
572, 578 (1984).
" Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 129, 695 P.2d 653, 660,
211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 363 (1985) (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629-
32, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 607 (1983).
No duty to protect invitees arises unless the defendant knew, or had reason to
know, that criminal acts were occurring, or immediately about to occur, that posed




foreseeability' 00 and thereby ignores the impact that prior incidents and
the general prevalence of criminal activity should have on the conduct
of a reasonably prudent person. Instead it deals with each incident in
isolation, as if it were the first of its kind. In effect, those courts main-
taining a special facts approach recognize a cause of action only for
failure to exercise due care in reacting to a crime occurring on the
premises. They do not recognize a cause of action for failure to take
adequate steps to prevent criminal activity. 101
The prior similar incidents rule 02 is also subject to criticism for a
number of reasons, not the least of which is its denial of compensation
to the first victim. The business inviter is given one free crime before
liability is imposed. 0 3 Not only does such a rule run contrary to the
policy of compensating injured parties, but it also discourages business
inviter participation in preventive security schemes. Theories of envi-
ronmental design for crime prevention are based on an acceptance of
the existence of criminal behavior.'0 If business inviters are not re-
quired to take reasonable steps to provide security until after one of
their patrons has been attacked, much valuable time will have been lost
in implementing environmental design changes. Business inviters will
be permitted to disregard the safety of their invitees until an injury has
occurred. Only then will they have to investigate the efficacy of the
available options, such as lights and security patrols."0 5
The prior similar acts rule also produces extraordinarily arbitrary
results. Courts are free to determine for themselves how similar, how
close in time, and how near in location prior incidents must be for a
duty to arise.108 The rule can be applied to exclude evidence of prior
crimes that occurred in the vicinity of a business, but not on its prem-
100 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
101 The distinction between these two duties is described in J. PAGE, THE LAW
OF PREMISES LIABILITY § 4.11, at 89-91 (1976).
102 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
102 See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 127, 695 P.2d 653,
658, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 361 (1985).
10, See 0. NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 4.
105 One environmental design expert has argued that just as buildings that are
unsafe as potential health or fire hazards should be and often are condemned, buildings
unsafe as potential settings for criminal activity should be condemned until the problem
is corrected. See C. JEFFERY, supra note 84, at 207-08.
108 See, e.g., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 55 n.12, 449 N.E.2d
331, 337 n.12 (1983) (comparing a case in which acts of trespass and vandalism gave
rise to a duty to protect to one in which more severe acts were found insufficient to give
rise to a duty). Compaie Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149,
156, 369 A.2d 38, 42 (Law Div. 1976) (finding five previous assaults on premises
sufficient notice) with McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 756,
272 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1980) (finding 10 prior alarms at bank insufficient notice).
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ises, despite the defendant inviter's awareness of their occurrence.1 0 7 It
may also be used arbitrarily to divide a business inviter's premises into
wholly separate areas, so that criminal activity in one area is not evi-
dence of the likelihood of criminal activity in another.108 Finally, as
discussed, one court has found that property crimes and crimes against
the person are not "similar," so that evidence of the prior occurrence of
one does not give rise to a duty to protect against the other.'"
This latter "division of interests" approach has been criticized for
allowing the allegedly negligent party to avoid liability when the actual
damage that occurs differs only slightly from the damage that could be
anticipated. 10 This approach can be further criticized because the rea-
sonable business inviter's response to a rash of property crimes may
effectively prevent the occurrence of crimes against the person as well.
Improved lighting, for example, should reduce the amount of criminal
activity on the premises in general, not just the occurrence of one spe-
cific type of crime.
Moreover, the determination of whether a particular act is "fore-
seeable" properly involves consideration of a number of factors. The
simple fact that a particular event has not occurred before does not
make it one that should not reasonably be anticipated."' A court
should also consider the potential gravity of the harm." 2 The existence
107 See Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also supra note 61 (discussing Meadows).
108 See McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590, 593-94, 302 S.E.2d 130, 132-33
(1983); McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 756, 272 S.E.2d
592, 593 (1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 57-60 (discussing McCoy and
McClendon).
109 See Taylor v. Hocker, 101 Ill. App. 3d 639; 642, 428 N.E.2d 662, 665 (1981);
see also supra text accompanying note 64 (discussing Taylor).
10 A comment to the Restatement rejects the division-of-interests approach:
[T]he fact that the interest to which harm results is a different interest, or
a different kind of interest, from that which was threatened with harm,
will not prevent the actor from being liable, so long as the interest in fact
harmed is one entitled to legal protection against negligence .... The
plaintiff is not subjected to fragmentation in terms of risk of harm to his
foot, his hand, his eye, his chattels, or his land.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 281 comment j (1965); see also Goodhart, The
Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449, 467 (1930) ("Obvi-
ously a single distinction between bodily security on one hand and property security on
the other would be too broad.").
"I See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 127, 695 P.2d 653,
659, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362 (1985); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47,
55, 449 N.E.2d 331, 337 (1983). Prosser and Keeton write that "[f]oreseeability of
consequences . . . is only one of the factors which are important in determining negli-
gence. Into the scales with it there must also be thrown the gravity of the harm if it is
to occur, and against both must be weighed the utility of the challenged conduct."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 43, at 298.
11" See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 43, at 298.
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of a duty has traditionally depended as well on convenience of adminis-
tration, the capacity of the parties to bear the loss, the prevention of
future injuries, the culpability of the defendant, and other considera-
tions that are the product of changing social conditions.11 A proper
weighing of these factors leads to a rejection of a special facts or prior
similar acts approach.
B. Policy Reasons for Accepting an Unqualified Duty to Protect
A rule establishing an unqualified duty to protect would be easier
to understand and administer than any one, or some variation of one, of
the existing limited-duty rules. Once it is established that the requisite
business inviter/invitee relationship exists, the question whether the
duty was breached would be one for the trier of fact. Jurors, as mem-
bers of the community, are best able to determine what is reasonable
under the circumstances. Indeed, this is one reason for the tremendous
amount of power that tort law vests in their judgment. 4
Economic theory reveals that the benefits of imposing an unquali-
fied duty to protect would outweigh its costs to society. Under the the-
ory of enterprise liability, losses resulting from a business activity are to
be imposed on that activity. 1 5 The market can then effectively allocate
the community's resources; the prices of goods and services will include
the costs of liability and thus reflect the true costs of making them
available.1"" These costs can then be passed on to consumers through
'll See id. § 54, at 359; see also Comment, supra note 23, at 470-71 (suggesting
additional policy considerations, including foreseeability of harm, certainty of the plain-
tiff's injury, and consequences to the community).
114 For further description of the functions of judge and jury in this context, see
infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
115 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 506-07 (1961); 1 S. SPErsER, C. KROuSE & H. GANS, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 1:30, at 96-103 (1983). The doctrine of enterprise liability is usually
referred to in the context of strict liability even though the loss-spreading rationale
applies also to liability for negligent acts committed by a business. This Comment does
not propose strict liability as a solution to the problem of patron victimization; a busi-
ness will be held liable for criminal acts committed by third parties against patrons
only if there is a threshold determination that the business was negligent in providing
safe premises.
116 See I S. SpErIsa, C. KRousE & H. GANS, supra note 115, at 96-97 (discuss-
ing Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153
(1976)). This rationale is evident in the dissent in Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d
188 (Tenn. 1975):
The modem phenomenon of merchandising and marketing through
community shopping centers has opened a new vista into the concept of
tort liability of the owners, occupiers or possessors of public business
premises. . . . The primary incentive to the utilization of these shopping
areas is the availability of adequate and free parking facilities, which the
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higher prices.1 17 The price of the goods or services offered then reflects
the cost of security measures, judgments against the inviter, and liabil-
ity insurance. Even though these costs are being passed on, the business
inviter will want to minimize such costs in order to remain competitive
in the market. It is therefore unlikely that the business inviter will
choose to pay liability judgments or insurance premiums rather than
establish safer premises. The costs of better lighting and more frequent
patrolling, for example, do not compare to the cost of liability in
wrongful death actions. In addition, insurers may demand increased se-
curity before providing liability insurance to the business inviter. A
business inviter, therefore, will want to install security measures, and
the cost of such measures will be paid by consumers. If, instead, a busi-
ness inviter is protected by law from liability, the individual victim
must bear the full brunt of the loss.
The magnitude of that loss can be great. Among the emotional and
financial hardships commonly suffered by crime victims are the costs of
emergency medical treatment, loss of earnings or support, loss of prop-
erty, and feelings of helplessness, isolation, and anxiety. In some in-
stances the emotional trauma can be severe and long lasting. 1 Greater
sensitivity to the plight of crime victims has led to increased success in
suits against third parties for their criminal acts. 1 9 The establishment
of civil liability in suits against the third party may be easy, but the
perpetrator is often unknown, or the suit is ineffective due to collection
problems.
12 0
Society's interest in crime prevention is served in various ways by
public, in general, is invited to use . . . with the expectancy that the
tradesmen in the market places will profit by such use. Having thus
caused enormous congregations . . . in relatively compact areas, certain
duties devolve upon the invitors for the benefit and protection of the
invitees.
Id. at 199 (Henry, J., dissenting).
117 See e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 775 n.20, 478 P.2d 465, 477
n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 757 n.20 (1970) ("By assigning liability to the motel in those
cases in which no direct evidence establishes causation, we make sure that all motel
guests bear their fair share of these damages . . .).
l8 See Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 424-26, 461 A.2d 225, 230-31
(1983), rev'd, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984); Hearings, supra note 23, at 9-11
(statement of Neil Hartigan, Attorney General, Illinois).
119 See Comment, supra note 23, at 461-63 (citing Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S.
459 (1947) (duty to defendant arising from employer/employee relationship); Tobin v.
Slutsky, 506 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1974) (duty to defendant arising from innkeeper/guest
relationship); Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 396 F. Supp. 80 (D.S.C. 1975)
(duty to defendant arising from carrier/passenger relationship); Ramsay v. Morrissette,
252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969) (duty to defendant arising from landlord/tenant
relationship)).
12 See Comment, supra note 23, at 459 n.4.
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imposing a duty to protect on the business inviter. Businesses fearing
liability will pressure the public sector to step up crime prevention ef-
forts in the community, and because of the influence that businesses can
exert by virtue of'the economic benefits they confer on the community,
this pressure could prove to be effective. High crime rates in a commu-
nity may also mean reduced patronage for businesses. Since these con-
cerns may influence a decision to relocate, or to choose a community for
a new undertaking,121 public officials should be genuinely concerned
about the impact on the local economy that a failure to take steps to
prevent crime may have. Finally, cooperation between the public and
private sectors in crime prevention is absolutely essential to a truly suc-
cessful community crime prevention program. 22
C. A Response to Some of the Criticisms of an
Unqualified Duty to Protect
A duty-to-protect rule has been criticized for being unreasonably
vague and incapable of a precise definition that would give business
inviters guidance as to what is necessary to meet the rule's require-
ments. 2 Although what constitutes "reasonable steps" in all situations
is incapable of a mathematically precise definition, the alert business
inviter will be safe to take those steps that in the exercise of good judg-
ment seem necessary, and waive those that do not. Once a group of
individuals in a given community begins to respond to the duty, a cus-
tom or standard will develop. Conformity with that standard gives rise
to an inference that the community believes the behavior is reasona-
ble.1 24 Only in rare circumstances will "reasonable prudence" be deter-
mined to be different from "common prudence." '25 Thus, by simply
121 See J. CONKLIN, supra note 11, at 5-6.
122 See, e.g., A. BILx, J. KLorr & R. FEDERAL, supra note 84, at 206 ("[A]II
parties, other than the criminal offender, are misserved by the failure on the part of the
police administrator and the private security manager to reach out and build a bridge of
understanding and trust between the two groups."); Note, Duty of Mall Owners, supra
note 71, at 1135. But see Reichenbach v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366,
1368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Cowart, J., concurring) ("[Liaw enforcement rarely
prevents a crime and then only when, by chance or by specific information ... , there
is opportunity to take specific action to prevent a particular crime. Innkeepers should
not be legally required to do what organized society cannot do.") (footnotes omitted),
petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1982); Note, Merchant's Duty to Pro-
tect, supra note 71, at 123 n.70 (asserting that it is already in the business inviter's
interest to keep crime as low as possible on the premises).
122 See Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 193-94 (Tenn. 1975); Case Note,
Commercial Landlord's Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Party, 22 WAYNE L.
REv. 1483, 1490-91 (1976).
124 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 33, at 193-94.
125 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
1986]
910 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
conforming to the actions taken by those similarly situated, the inviter
can be reasonably certain that the duty is being satisfied. In addition,
the conscientious business inviter should find that a wealth of informa-
tion and guidance is available from experts in the field of crime
prevention.
Business inviters have a wide range of options available when re-
sponding to a legal requirement that they take reasonable steps to pro-
tect their invitees. Although there is case law to suggest that courts and
juries may look favorably on the use of a warning,128 the duty proposed
herein is one of protection-not of warning. Some business inviters may
find it appropriate to minimize business after daylight hours. Lighting,
fencing, video surveillance, shopper escort services, and security patrols
are some of the available options.1217 In addition, there are a number of
design options available to businesses.12 Concerns about the prolifera-
tion of private security forces have been expressed,12 but the availabil-
ity of the above options will limit the necessity for such private forces.
Since negligent acts of private security forces may expose the business
inviter to increased liability, businesses will not likely choose to employ
private security forces where other options are equally effective." Fur-
thermore, the concern over the proliferation of private security forces is
not shared by all those with knowledge of their operations."'
Finally, the fear that juries would impose insurer liability is un-
12 See Phillips v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 413 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (A warning sign indicating to customers that the premises were patrolled was
sufficient to justify a jury's finding that the defendant did not breach the duty to pro-
tect.). But see supra note 50 (discussing inviter's duty to warn invitees).
127 See Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149, 157-58, 369
A.2d 38, 43 (Law Div. 1976); D. HUGHES & P. BOWLER, supra note 16, at 7-10, 44-
47.
'2 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr.
575 (1979) (finding that store security personnel violated the civil rights of an accused
shoplifter); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 577, 198 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The intrusion of private industry into the business of public
safety has been one of the most unfortunate phenomena of the 1960's and the 1970's.");
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 645, 281 S.E.2d 36, 42 (1981)
(Carlton, J., dissenting) (Protection of patrons requires special training, skills, and a
willingness to do "whatever is required to prevent assaults."); Freedman, Store Ruled
Not Liable for Protection of Patrons, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 7, col. 1 ("[T]he
presence of armed guards may not deter robberies, and their intervention during a
holdup would increase the 'likelihood of exchange of gunfire . . . .' ") (quoting Wil-
liams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)).
130 See A. BiER, J. KLo-rra & R. FEDERAL, supra note 84, at 206.
21 Arthur Bilek, John Klotter, and R. Keegan Federal argue that private security
forces perform quite well in areas in which the police are traditionally weak, such as
the creation of prevention and detection mechanisms. They predict an increasing level
of professionalism among private security forces as reliance on them increases. See id.
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warranted. Under the scheme proposed here, the judge would find that
if the plaintiff is the defendant's business invitee, the defendant is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect
the invitee from criminal acts by third parties. The question whether
that duty was breached does not go to the jury until the judge has de-
termined that the answer to the question is uncertain."' 2 Even when the
question does go to the jury, its members should receive explicit in-
structions from the judge on the standard that must be applied. Instruc-
tions are intended to prevent jurors from applying an individual, rather
than a societal, standard.1 " The negligence issue is normally referred
to as one of fact because it'is believed to be appropriate, in the law of
torts, for determination by a jury.'" There seems to be no reason to
doubt the efficacy of this historical distinction between the roles of the
judge and the jury in cases involving the business inviter/invitee
relationship.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for courts to impose a duty on business inviters
to protect their invitees from third parties' criminal acts occurring on
business premises. The societal conditions that gave rise to the common
law rule no longer exist, and judicial attempts to modify it have failed.
The goals of the tort system are better served when a jury decides
whether a business inviter acted reasonably under the circumstances
than when a judge dismisses a plaintiff's case on summary judgment or
directs a verdict for the inviter because of the wooden application of a
rule that is the product of judicial ambivalence.
133 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 37, at 237; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 328C(b) & comment b (1965).
'. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 37, at 236-37.
13 See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 83, at 344.
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